This paper investigates the computational complexity of reasoning with English sentences featuring temporal prepositions and the order-denoting adjectives first and last. A fragment of English featuring these constructions, called T PE, is defined by means of a context-free grammar. The phrase-structures which this grammar assigns to the sentences it recognizes can be viewed as formulas of an interval temporal logic, called T PL, whose satisfaction-conditions faithfully represent the meanings of the corresponding English sentences. It is shown that the satisfiability problem for T PL is NEXPTIME-complete.
Introduction
Consider the following sentences:
(1) An interrupt was received during every cycle (2) The main process ran after the last cycle (3) While the main process ran, an interrupt was received before loop 1 was executed for the first time. These sentences speak of events and their temporal locations: of what happened and when. The principal devices they employ to encode this information are temporal prepositions and the adjectives first and last. The aim of this paper is to answer the question: What is the computational complexity of reasoning with sentences encoding temporal information using such devices?
This question is of theoretical interest, because the events mentioned in (1)-(3)-cycles, executions of processes, receipts of interrupts-are extended in time;
and temporal logics which deal with extended events-so-called interval temporal logics-typically exhibit high computational complexity. Thus, the bestknown interval temporal logic, HS (Halpern and Shoham [6] , see also Venema [19] ), is undecidable, with little known about its decidable fragments. (For a discussion, see Goranko and Montanari [5] ). Indeed, the best-known decidable interval temporal logic, ITL (Moszkowski [11] ), assumes that its non-logical primitives are in fact point-events, and yet still has a non-elementary satisfiability problem. Given that the syntax of these logics has little affinity with that of temporal expressions in English, it is natural to ask whether the meanings of sentences such as (1)-(3) can be captured in a computationally manageable logic.
Further theoretical motivation comes from the side of natural language semantics. The formal semantics of temporal constructions in English has been addressed by a succession of researchers (Crouch and Pullman [2] , Dowty [4] , Hwang and Schubert [9] , Kamp and Reyle [10] , Ogihara [12] , Stump [16] , ter Meulen [17] to name but a few). Yet natural language semanticists typically employ whatever formalism is sufficiently expressive to capture the sentencemeanings they identify and sufficiently familiar to command the assent of the relevant academic community. In particular, most accounts of the semantics of temporal constructions in English represent sentence-meanings in a first-order language having variables which range over time-intervals and predicates which correspond to event-types and temporal order-relations; and such a logic is easily shown to be undecidable. Given the recent surge of interest in logical fragments of limited computational complexity, this situation is unsatisfactory. There are evident practical and theoretical reasons for presenting the semantics of various natural language constructions, where possible, using formal systems of limited expressive power.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the semantics of the English temporal constructions considered in this paper. Section 3 then uses a simple context-free grammar to define a fragment of English featuring these constructions; we call this fragment T PE, an acronym for temporal preposition English. We show how the phrase-structures assigned to T PE-sentences by this grammar can in fact be viewed as expressions in an interval temporal logic, which we call T PL. Section 4 presents formal semantics for T PL. Sections 5 and 6 provide matching upper and lower complexity-bounds for T PL-satisfiability, showing that this problem is NEXPTIME-complete.
The following terminology and notation will be used throughout. We take a (time) interval to be a closed, bounded, convex (non-empty) subset of the real line. We denote the set of intervals by I, and we use the (possibly decorated) letters I, J, . . . , as variables ranging over I. Observe that intervals may be punctual. If I and J denote the intervals [a, b] and [c, d] , respectively, with a, b, c, d ∈ R and a ≤ c ≤ d ≤ b, we let the terms init(J, I) and fin(J, I) denote the intervals [a, c] and [d, b] , respectively. In other words, whenever J ⊆ I is true, we take init(J, I) to denote the initial segment of I up to the beginning of J, and fin(J, I) to denote the final segment of I from the end of J. More standardly, the symbol ⊂ always denotes the strict subset relation, and ⊆ the corresponding non-strict relation. Finally, we occasionally employ the definite quantifier ιx(φ, ψ) with the standard (Russellian) semantics.
Semantics
In this section, we consider the semantics of the temporal constructions featured in the fragment of English defined below-principally, the temporal prepositions. Here, we follow modern usage and count temporal subordinating conjunctions as temporal prepositions taking clausal (rather than nominal) complements. We defer a formal specification of the fragment in question to Section 3, and the mechanical derivation of sentence-meanings to Section 4.
Temporal preposition-phrases: basic semantics
(4) An interrupt was received (5) An interrupt was received during every cycle (6) An interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process ran (7) After the initialization phase, an interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process ran. Sentence (4) asserts that, within some contextually specified interval of interest, there is an interval over which an interrupt was received. Interpreting the unary predicate int-rec so that it is satisfied by all and only those time intervals over which an interrupt was received, we may thus represent the meaning of (4) by the formula: (8) ∃J 0 (int-rec(J 0 ) ∧ J 0 ⊂ I). Notice that the temporal context to which the quantification in (4) is limited is represented by the free variable I in (8) . That is: the meaning of (4) is a temporal abstract, receiving a truth-value (in an interpretation) only relative to a time interval. Viewing sentence meanings in this way greatly simplifies the semantics of temporal preposition-phrases.
Sentence (5) asserts that, within the given temporal context, every interval over which a cycle occurs includes some interval over which an interrupt was received. Interpreting the unary predicate cyc so that it is satisfied by all and only those time intervals over which a cycle occurs, we may thus represent the meaning of (5) by the formula: (9) ∀J 1 (cyc(J 1 ) ∧ J 1 ⊂ I → ∃J 0 (int-rec(J 0 ) ∧ J 0 ⊂J 1 )). The normal type in (9) indicates the material contributed by the temporal preposition-phrase during every cycle, and the light type the material contributed by the sentence An interrupt was received, which it modifies. Observe that this material in light type is identical to the formula (8) , except that the free temporal context variable has been bound by a quantifier introduced by the temporal preposition-phrase. On this view, the temporal preposition-phrase functions semantically as a modal operator, mapping one temporal abstract to another.
Sentences (6)- (7) can now be treated analogously. Making use of the notation introduced at the end of Section 1, and helping ourselves to a suitable signature of unary predicates of intervals, we may plausibly represent these sentences' truth-conditions, as, respectively:
. We pass over the usual issues as to the faithfulness of the Russelian interpretation of definite quantification (either expressed or implied) in these sentences. Again, the normal type in (10) and (11) indicates the material contributed by the newly-added temporal preposition-phrases in (6) and (7) respectively, and the light type the material contributed by the sentences they modify. Again, this colouring scheme highlights the fact that the successive temporal preposition phrases function semantically as modal operators, binding the temporal context variables associated with the sentences they modify. This cascading quantification, typical of iterated temporal preposition phrases, was pointed out in Pratt and Francez [14] , and is discussed further in von Stechow [20] .
The fragment of temporal English considered here deals only with events, as opposed to states-that is, only with telic as opposed to atelic eventualities (Vendler [18] ; see, e.g. Steedman [15] for an extended discussion). The thesis that all simple, event-reporting sentences are implicitly existentially quantified was proposed by Davidson [3] , and is defended in Parsons [13] . These authors take the quantification in question to be over events rather than time intervals; but this issue may be ignored for present purposes. A recent collection of papers on this topic can be found in Higginbotham et al. [7] . One could doubtless quibble about whether the ⊂ in (8)-(11) should be ⊆; however, the operative concepts seem too vague for this issue to admit of resolution.
Complications
It is impossible, within the space of a few pages, to do full justice to the complexities of the English constructions featured in this paper. Nevertheless, some elaboration of the foregoing account is required; we confine ourselves to those features of greatest relevance to the ensuing computational analysis. For a comprehensive guide to the grammar of English prepositions, see Huddleston and Pullum [8] (Ch. 7); for an account of the English temporal prepositions in particular, see e.g. Bennett [1] .
We begin with some remarks on the temporal preposition before. We take the sentence (12) An interrupt was received before the main process ran to be true in a temporal context I when there is a unique running of the main process during I, and an interrupt is received over some subinterval of I prior thereto. Ordinary usage is vague as to whether it is the beginning-or end-times of the events in question that are being compared. To resolve any uncertainly, we simply take (12) to require that some interrupt-event finished before the run of the main process began. We therefore propose to render the meaning of (12) by (13) 
Notice that these truth-conditions impose no limit on how long before the running of the main process the interrupt was received (except that imposed by the temporal context I). That is: before is here used in the sense of some time before. In some situations, however, before is more naturally taken to mean just before or shortly before. This latter sense reflects the possibility of adding a time-measure as a specifier, as in the phrase five minutes before. In this paper, we ignore this latter sense of before entirely: incorporating it into our account would involve us in a discussion of either vagueness or the semantics of temporal measure-phrases, both of which we choose to avoid.
Actually, the previous paragraph is misleading in glossing the sense of before assumed here as some time before. For the existential quantification in the meaning (13) of (12) is not provided by the before-phrase at all, but rather by the sentence An interrupt was received occurring in its scope; the before-phrase serves merely to specify a temporal context to which that quantification is restricted. In fact, there is no reason why this quantification need be existential at all, thus: (14) An interrupt was received during every cycle before the main process ran. We take (14) to have the meaning (10) ; that is, we take it to be (truthconditionally) synomymous with (6) . Here again, the before-phrase in (14) serves merely to identify a temporal context to which the quantification in its scope is restricted; in particular, it provides no universal quantification of its own.
As for before, so for until: until-phrases serve only to create temporal contexts restricting the quantification provided by the sentences in their scope; but they do not provide that quantification. This is most aparent by considering the pair of sentences (5) and (6) , where the universal quantification evidently arises from the determiner every. This treatment of until may surprise readers familiar with so-called until-operators in temporal logic, whose semantics do typically contribute universal quantification. Apparently, there is an association of until with universal quantification, at least in the minds of temporal logicians; and it is natural to ask how this apparent association can be reconciled with the view adopted here.
The answer is as follows. Sentence (5), which the until-phrase in sentence (6) modifies, is downward monotonic: if it is true over some interval I, then it is also true over all subintervals of I. (Downward monotonicity is, of course, characteristic of sentences which universally quantify over subintervals.) It transpires that until-phrases require a downward-monotonic scope, as witnessed by the anomalous: (15) ? An interrupt was received until the main process ran (16) ? An interrupt was received during some cycle until the main process ran. Thus, on our account, the universal quantification-or more accurately, downward monotonicity-is not provided by until; but the presence of until requires it to be provided by something else. Before, of course imposes no such requirement, as we have seen. Thus, on our account, the difference between before (in the sense adopted here) and until, lies not in their contribution to truthconditions, but merely in the situations in which they can be used. Actually, downward monotonicity is not always sufficient for applicability of until-phrases (see e.g. Zucchi and White [21] ). The exploration of this issue-and indeed of the myriad other differences between before and until-lies outside the scope of the present enquiry. We note in passing that until, like before, also allows nominal complements; however, in the case of until, these complements must clearly denote an event or a time: (17) An interrupt was received during every cycle until 5 o' clock/the first execution of the main process (18) ? An interrupt was received during every cycle until the main process.
The preposition when creates another sort of difficulty. When serves primarily to indicate proximity between the events identified in its scope and complement, thus: (19) An interrupt was received when the main process ran. Sentences such as (19) in fact impose remarkably loose constraints on the temporal relation between the events in question, as various writers have noted. But whatever the final verdict on the nature of those constraints, we cannot usefully treat the associated vagueness in the present paper, and some further regimentation is necessary. To simplify issues, we treat (19) as synomymous with (20) An interrupt was received while the main process ran, and give it the semantics (21)
Our excuse for doing so is simply that inclusion is an easier relation to work with than approximate collocation. Readers who find this expedient too brutal can simply omit when from our fragment.
We have so far discussed quantification in the scope of temporal prepositions; we now move to the issue of quantification in their complements. Nominal complements of temporal prepositions typically include determiners; and these determiners contribute quantification to the meanings of sentences containing them. This is evident, for example, with the occurrences of during every cycle in (5)- (7), which contribute the universal quantifiers in (9)- (11) .
Clausal complements of temporal prepositions, by contrast, typically lack an overt determiner; and the question therefore arises as to how the variables in these complements get quantified. The answer is that they are (almost always) definitely quantified-i.e. bound by an ι-operator. Thus, until the main process ran in (6) is interpreted as until the unique time over which the main process ran, as reflected by the ι-quantifier in (10) . It may seem harsh to count (6) as false if there are two runs of the main process within the temporal context; it would perhaps be fairer to interpret the relevant until-phrase as picking out the period before the first time over which the main process ran. But since this facility is available in our fragment anyway, as discussed in Section 2.3, the issue need not detain us.
The obvious exception to the rule that temporal prepositions interpret their clausal complements as definitely quantified is whenever. Thus, we take (22) Whenever the main process ran, an interrupt was received to have the truth-conditions
That is: the variable contributed by the complement of the whenever-phrase is universally quantified. In the sequel, we shall assume that all quantification in clausal complements of temporal prepositions is definite, except in the case of whenever, where is it universal. Note that we are mimicking our earlier discussion of when in again taking the operative temporal relation here to be inclusion rather than approximate collocation. As before, this represents a certain deviation from ordinary usage; again, however, we cannot sensibly deal with vague truth-conditions here, and so we pass over the issue. Interestingly enough, the word whilever does not exist.
Some temporal prepositions have been conspicuous by their absence from the foregoing discussion. The temporal prepositions on and in, in phrases such as on Mondays or in January, are specific to certain categories of arguments, but are otherwise equivalent to during. Since this detail clearly has no logical significance, we ignore these uses of in and on, and confine our attention to during. The preposition at, which in English is used in conjunction with clock-times (and some religious festivals) may also fall into this category, though there are further complications here concerning its inherent approximateness. The propositions for and in, in phrases such as for/in five minutes, take as complements temporal measure-phrases. These lie outside the scope of the logic considered here.
The preposition by, in its temporal sense, functions analogously to until, except that it prefers upward-monotonic sentences in its scope; moreover, like until, it dislikes complements which are not explicitly temporal, thus: (24) An interrupt was received by 5 o'clock (25) ? An interrupt was received by the first cycle. (Note that (25) has a perfectly natural reading in which by is interpreted nontemporally.) In addition, by exhibits interesting interactions with aspect: (26) The main process ran/had run/was running by 5 o'clock. Finally, we observe that by occurs frequently in the construction by the time . . . with a clausal complement, again with the same preference for qualifying 8 upward-monotonic sentences. Dealing with the rather difficult behaviour of by in our fragment would complicate the grammar without adding anything of logical interest, and so we ignore it.
In some respects, the mirror-image of both until and by is since: (27) An interrupt has been received since the main process ran (28) An interrupt has been received during every cycle since the main process ran.
(When used in its temporal sense, since requires the sentence in its scope to have perfect aspect.) Unlike until and by, however, since resists embedding in contexts established by quantification, as we see by comparing (29) During every cycle, an interrupt did not occur until the main process ran (30) ? During every cycle, an interrupt has/had not occurred since the main process ran. Because of these complications, we do not include since in our fragment. However, we do include after, which we take (again, ignoring some linguistic subtleties) to function as a mirror image of before. Given the inclusion of after, our omission of since does not affect the fragment's expressive power.
First and Last
Our fragment will also contain sentences such as (31) An interrupt was received during the first cycle (32) An interrupt was received before the main process ran for the last time.
Suppose that, in the relevant temporal context I, there is an unambiguously first cycle: that is, a cycle which begins and ends before all the others. Then (31) asserts that, if J is the interval over which this cycle occurs, then an interrupt was received over some sub-interval of J. A corresponding account can of course be given for (32). Problems arise, however, when there is no unambiguously first cycle within I. Suppose, for example, cycles occur during intervals J 1 , J 2 , and nowhere else, in either of the following arrangements. (In such diagrams, left-to-right arrangement depicts temporal order; vertical arrangement has no significance.)
It is unclear what the truth-value of (31) should be in such cases. Apparently, we need to legislate.
We take the mathematically simplest way out. Since we may assume that only finitely many events of any given type e occur within a given interval I, we proceed as follows. Let J be the collection of all subintervals of I over which an event of type e occurs, and assume J is nonempty. Since J is by hypothesis finite, we can select the (non-empty) subset J whose elements have the (unique) earliest end-point. Now select the unique element J ∈ J whose start-point is latest. Thus, J is the smallest of the earliest-ending sub-intervals of I over which an e-event occurs. In the sequel, then, we interpret the phrase the first e, within a temporal context I, to pick out this interval. (In the situations depicted above, these are the intervals marked J 1 .) Similarly, we interpret the phrase the last e, within a temporal context I including at least one occurrence of e, to pick out the smallest of the latest-beginning sub-intervals of I over which an e-event occurs. To re-iterate, we are simply legislating here in the most convenient way in cases where native-speaker intuition returns no clear verdict.
A Fragment of Temporal English
The task of this section is to define a fragment of temporal English. We do this by writing a context-free grammar to recognize its sentences. The grammar assigns phrase-structures to these sentences in the familiar way, and we shall see that, following some cosmetic re-arrangement, the phrase-structures in question can be regarded as expressions in a formal language. This formal language will constitute the basis of the temporal logic T PL defined in Section 4.
Delineating the fragment
We begin with the simplest sentences in our fragment: (33) An interrupt was received (34) An interrupt was not received. For present purposes, sentence (33) is taken as atomic: that is, we ignore its internal structure. Accordingly we treat such sentences as vocabulary items, of class S 0 , and write the grammar rules:
Moreover, the only property of sentence (34) which concerns us is its relation to (33): that is, we wish to ignore other aspects of its structure. Accordingly, we pretend that (34) is obtained by simply prefixing the word not to (33), and write the grammar rules:
This expedient removes needless clutter from our grammar, while affecting nothing of logical substance. (It is a simple exercise to restore the clutter.) Thus, our grammar assigns to (33) (33)- (34) These diagrams feature the symbols int-rec and ¬, as specified in the grammar rules. These symbols are simply abbreviations which will be used later.
Temporal prepositions with nominal complements belong in our grammar to the category P N , and occur in phrases such as (35) during every cycle (36) after the initialization phase (37) before the first interrupt. Nominal expressions such as cycle, initialization phase and interrupt are taken to be of (lexical) category N 0 and to denote event-types in the same way as items of category S 0 . Again, we regard them as structureless:
We allow these expressions to be optionally modified (once) by the orderspecifying adjectives first and last, resulting in a phrase which in turn combines with a determiner to produce the complement of a temporal preposition. Accordingly, we write the grammar rules:
Thus, our grammar assigns to (35)-(37) the respective phrase-structures shown in Fig. 2 . As before, we have augmented terminal nodes with the corresponding mnemonics to the right of the slashes in the lexicon; again, these symbols will be used later as abbreviations. The variable subscript D in the above rules ranges over the set {∀, ∃, !}. These items are simply tags indicating subcategorization of NP, N 1 and P N . This subcategorization restricts the use of determiners in two ways. First, it requires that phrases involving first and last only ever combine with the definite article. This requirement reflects the observation that (outside university mathematics departments) locutions such as during a first interrupt and during every first interrupt are anomalous.
Our second restriction on the use of determiners requires that complements of the temporal prepositions until, before and after also incorporate the definite article. For until, this requirement serves to rule out some clearly anomalous sentences (it is the italicized every which causes the problem): (38) ? An interrupt occurred during every cycle until every reset point.
For before and after, the requirement reflects our earlier decision to interpret before in the sense of some time before, rather than shortly before. To see why, note that common usage (again: professional mathematicians excepted) does not take the sentences (39) An interrupt was received before every reset point (40) An interrupt was received before the first reset point to be equivalent in contexts where there is a unique first reset point, as our assumed sense of before would require. We conclude that the term before can only have the shortly-before sense in (39), and so we banish that sentence from our fragment. Admittedly, existentially quantified complements with these prepositions sound fine, even with our chosen sense of before: (41) An interrupt occurred before some reset point (42) An interrupt occurred during every cycle until some reset point. Indeed, such sentences could be admitted into our fragment without compromising the complexity-theoretic results derived below. However, banning sentences such as (38) while admitting those such as (42) will generate a logical fragment not fully closed under negation; and, while such fragments are unproblematic in principle, they tend to make for notational and conceptual clutter. For simplicity, therefore, we duck the issue, and simply decree that these temporal prepositions require complements with the definite article.
Temporal prepositions with clausal complements belong in our grammar to the category P S , and occur in phrases such as (43) before the main process ran (44) whenever the main process ran (45) while the main process ran for the last time. Unmodified clausal complements are taken to be atomic, again of category S 0 . Our grammar permits modification (once) of these clausal complements by the adverbials for the first/last time, analogous to the modification of nominal complements by the adjectives first/last. Accordingly, we write the grammar rules:
thus assigning to (43)-(45) the respective phrase-structures shown in Fig. 3 . Recall that whenever is associated with universal, rather than definite, quantification of its complement. That is why the grammar rule for whenever incorporates the bracket-pair [ ], rather than { }, to the right of the slash. The motivation for these mnemonics will be revealed in Section 4. Since we want to finesse issues of subsentential and subnominal structure, we leave it to grammar-writers' common sense to spot such nominalizations where they occur. The task of providing a more complex grammar to automate this job is independent of the issues addressed here. Finally, we have grammar rules to adjoin preposition-phrases to sentences and to handle sentence coordination using and and or. There are no surprises here: S → S, PP S → S, Conj, S Conj → and/∧ Conj → or/∨. (4)- (6) . Our grammar takes no account of fronted preposition-phrases, as illustrated, for example, by Sentence (7). It is obvious that this defect can easily be rectified. This completes our explanation of the fragment of English studied in this paper. We dub this fragment T PE, an acronym for temporal preposition English; the full list of grammar rules is given in the Appendix.
We close this section with a methodological remark. It should be obvious that the grammar of T PE, restricted as it is, accepts strings whose status as (4)- (6) English sentences-on syntactic, semantic or pragmatic grounds-is doubtful. As Sapir famously remarked: all grammars leak. At first sight, Sapir's maxim seems to dash any hope of determining the computational complexity of reasoning with a particular set of natural language constructions. For how can we guard against the possibility that certain restrictions on usage which a leaky grammar fails to incorporate might confer some computational advantage? And if we cannot, are we not in danger of over-estimating the computational complexity of the fragment of natural language under investigation? In fact, however, over-generation presents no threat to our results. As we shall see in Section 6, we can be confident that the complexity of reasoning with the temporal constructions featured in the fragment T PE will not change if and when we tighten up our grammar.
Re-writing phrase-structures
In Section 4, we show how phrase-structures in T PE can be treated as formulas in a language for which a recursive semantics can be given in the style due to Tarski. Moreover, the satisfaction-conditions thus associated with T PEsentences convincingly systematize the meanings proposed for the various examples considered in Section 2. To facilitate the presentation, we first subject T PE phrase-structures to some minor geometrical re-arrangement, which we now proceed to describe. We have three base cases and three recursive cases to consider.
First base case: Any phrase structures of the forms depicted in Fig. 1 will be re-written more compactly as follows:
(Here and in the sequel, we have replaced all terminal nodes with the material to the right of the obliques: this simply unclutters the diagrams.)
Second base case: Any phrase structure of category N 1 will be re-written more compactly as follows:
Third base case: Phrase-structures of category S 1 will be re-written analogously:
First recursive case: Consider a structure of category S immediately dominating a structure ∆ of category S and a PP with a nominal complement Γ. Assuming that we already know how to re-write ∆ and Γ, such a structure will be re-written more compactly as follows:
where denotes any of the bracket-pairs , [ ] or { }, and τ any of the symbols <, > or =.
Second recursive case:
Consider a structure of category S immediately dominating a structure ∆ of category S and a PP with a clausal complement Γ. Assuming that we already know how to re-write ∆ and Γ, such a structure will be re-written more compactly as follows:
where denotes either of the bracket-pairs [ ] or { }, and τ any of the symbols <, > or =.
Third recursive case: Any structure of category S immediately dominating a node of category Conj will be re-written more compactly as an expression with major connectives ∧ or ∨ in the obvious way. The details are routine and are left to the reader to spell out formally.
Consider, for example, the phrase-structures of the T PE-sentence (4)-(6), as drawn in Fig. 4 . Re-writing these phrase-structures yields the respective expressions:
Apart from some unusual brackets and decorations, which will be explained later, the results of this re-arrangement look remarkably like formulas of propositional dynamic logic, with the event-classifying mnemonics occupying the place of atomic programs. So they look; and so they are. We shall give a standard account of the semantics of these formulas along the lines of the usual semantics for propositional dynamic logic. We stress (though it is obvious) that no information has been created or destroyed in this re-arrangement process: it is a simple graphical matter of replacing an unfamiliar logical typography with a more familiar (and more compact) one. We could have stuck with trees if we had really wanted. There is one further round of simplification before we proceed. We have demonstrated how PPs in the fragment T PE can be regarded (syntactically) as modal operators of the form α τ , where α is an expression of one of the forms e, e f or e l , is one of , [ ] or { }, and τ is one of =, < or >. However, our grammar imposes restrictions on the quantification in PP-complements ensuring that, if τ ∈ {<, >} or if α has one of the forms e f , e l , then is { }. This cuts down the set of modal operators to the forms
where e corresponds to a vocabulary item (of category S 0 or N 0 ), τ ∈ {<, >} and ω ∈ {f, l}. Finally, to avoid clutter, we may take the =-subscripts as understood, e.g. writing [e] instead of [e] = . Thus, the final collection of operators is
with e, τ and ω as above. Let us take stock. In Section 2, we proposed truth-conditions for a range of sentences involving temporal prepositions and the order-denoting adjectives first and last. By treating sentence-meanings as temporal abstracts, we showed how temporal preposition-phrases could be viewed (semantically) as modal operators. In this section, we have formalized the English fragment we are working with using a context-free grammar. We observed that the phrasestructures which this grammar associates with the sentences it recognizes can be re-arranged as formulas of a language whose syntax resembles propositional dynamic logic. Of course, the point of this re-arrangement is that the resulting formulas can be given a formal semantics which reproduces the truth-conditions proposed in Section 2. It is to that task we now turn.
The Temporal Logic
In the sequel, let E be a fixed infinite set. We refer to elements of E as eventatoms. Definition 1. Let e range over the set E of event-atoms. We define the categories of event-relation α, T PL-formula φ and T PL + -formula ψ by the syntax:
It is easy to see that the syntax of T PL matches that of the English fragment T PE exactly: T PL-formulas simply are phrase-structures in T PE and viceversa. The language T PL + is a slight liberalization of T PL, which removes some computationally insignificant restrictions. In the sequel, we avail ourselves of the Boolean connectives →, ↔ and ⊥, understood as abbreviations in the usual way. Our first task is to give a formal semantics for T PL + , and show that, for the fragment T PL, these semantics generate the satisfaction-conditions proposed in Section 2.
Recall from Section 1 that I denotes the set of intervals, where an interval is a closed, bounded, convex (non-empty) subset of R. Recall also the partial functions init(J, I) and fin(J, I) defined on I.
Definition 2. A T PL
+ -interpretation (henceforth: interpretation) is a finite subset of I × E. For any J ∈ I, we write A(J) for {e ∈ E | J, e ∈ A}, and for any e ∈ E, we write A(e) for {J ∈ I | J, e ∈ A}.
The motivation for restricting attention to finite models is simply that we have in mind situations in which event-atoms denote everyday event-types instantiated in finite contexts. Interpretations in which infinitely many events of a given type occur in a finite space of time are of no interest.
We now turn to the interpretation of event-relations. Recalling our (rather artificial) stipulations about the meanings of words first and last applied to eventtypes of which there is no unambiguously first or last instance, we adopt the following terminology. It is obvious that, since A is finite, if there exists any J ⊂ I such that J, e ∈ A, then the minimal-first and minimal-last such J exist and are unique.
We are now ready to give the satisfaction-conditions for formulas in T PL + .
Definition 5. Let φ be a formula, A an interpretation, and I ∈ I. We define A |= I φ recursively as follows:
1. A |= I e ψ iff for some J, A |= I,J e and A |= J ψ;
2. A |= I [e]ψ iff for all J, A |= I,J e implies A |= J ψ;
3.
A |= I {α}ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such that A |= I,J α, and for that J, A |= J ψ;
4.
A |= I {α} < ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such that A |= I,J α, and for that J, A |= init(J,I) ψ;
5.
A |= I {α} > ψ iff there is a unique J ⊂ I such that A |= I,J α, and for that J, A |= fin(J,I) ψ;
6. the usual rules for , ∧, ∨ and ¬.
If A |= I φ, we say that φ is true at I in A. If Φ is a set of formulas, we write A |= I Φ if A |= I φ for all φ ∈ Φ. If, for all A and I, A |= I Φ implies A |= I φ , we say that Φ entails φ ; if φ and φ are formulas such that {φ} entails φ , we say that φ entails φ . If φ and φ entail each other, we say they are logically equivalent and write φ ≡ φ . A set of formulas Φ is said to be satisfiable if, for some A and I, A |= I Φ.
Since any T PL-formula φ is just the phrase-structure of a T PL-sentence, the immediate question is whether the satisfaction-conditions assigned to φ in Definition 5 correctly reproduce the meanings proposed in Section 2.
A little thought shows that they do. Thus, for example, the grammar of Section 3 assigns to the sentences (46) An interrupt was received Unpicking the satisfaction-conditions specified in Definition 5, we see that these formulas are satisfied by exactly the same intervals in exactly the same structures as the respective first-order formulas (52) ∃J 0 (int-rec(J 0 ) ∧ J 0 ⊂ I)
), (assuming obvious interpretations for the non-logical vocabulary), which are precisely the meanings proposed in (8)- (10) . More generally, we took pains in Section 2 to show that preposition phrases could be regarded, semantically, as modal operators, mapping one temporal abstract to another, and binding the free-variable in their arguments. The formal semantics of T PL reflect this observation. In particular, we see how the various components of such a modal operator are contributed by the temporal preposition and its complement. The appropriatenes of the semantics for the modifiers · f and · l and the Boolean operators should be self-evident.
This concludes the first part of the paper. We have defined an English fragment, T PE, incorporating temporal prepositions and order-specifying adjectives. We have shown that sentences in this fragment can be regarded as formulas in an interval temporal logic T PL, with satisfaction-conditions matching the meanings which speakers of English assign to them, modulo the various caveats and occasional stipulations mentioned in Section 2. In particular, the problems of determining the satisfiability of a set of sentences or the validity of an argument in T PE are identical to the corresponding problems in T PL. In the second part of this paper, we proceed to determine the computational complexity of these problems.
Upper Complexity Bound
The aim of this section is to show that the satisfiability problem for T PL + (and hence T PL) is in NEXPTIME. This is achieved by establishing an exponential bound on the size of satisfying interpretations.
Lemma 1.
For all e ∈ E, φ ∈ T PL + , τ ∈ {<, >}, ω ∈ {f, l}:
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 2. Every T PL
+ -formula is equivalent to one in which ¬ appears only in subformulas of the forms ¬{e} and ⊥ (= ¬ ).
Proof. The logical equivalences of Lemma 1, together with familiar propositional validities, allow negations to be moved successively inwards until the desired form is reached. Definition 6. Let A = ∅ be an interpretation. The depth of A is the greatest m for which there exist J 1 ⊃ . . . ⊃ J m with A(J i ) = ∅ for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ m). If A is empty, we take its depth to be 0.
Lemma 3. Let φ be a T PL
+ -formula, A an interpretation and I an interval, such that A |= I φ. Then there exists an interpretation A * ⊆ A with depth at most O(|φ| 2 ) such that A * |= I φ.
Proof. We may assume that φ has the form guaranteed by Lemma 2. Let Φ be the set of subformulas of φ. For every event-atom e and every interval J, define
Thus, L e (J) records which subformulas of φ are true at an interval J, ignoring those subformulas which are true at any subinterval of J satisfying e. Say that a pair J, e ∈ A is redundant if L e (J) = ∅ and there exist K, K ∈ A(e) such that K ⊂ K ⊂ J. Now set
It is obvious that, if J ⊂ J with J, J ∈ A(e), then L e (J) and L e (J ) are disjoint. It follows that the depth of A * is bounded by m(m + 2), where m is the number of event-atoms occurring in φ and m the number of subformulas of φ. It thus suffices to show that, for all I and all ψ ∈ Φ, A |= I ψ implies A * |= I ψ.
We proceed by induction on the complexity of ψ. The base cases are of the forms ψ = , ⊥, ¬{e} . The first two of these are trivial. For the case ψ = ¬{e} , suppose A |= I ψ. If there is no J ⊂ I with J ∈ A(e), then since A * ⊆ A, we certainly have A * |= I ψ. Otherwise, there exist J ⊂ I and J ⊂ I with J = J and J, J ∈ A(e). If neither of the pairs J, e and J , e is redundant, then J, J ∈ A * (e). On the other hand, if J, e is redundant, there must exist K ⊂ K ⊂ J such that the pairs K, e and K , e are non-redundant elements of A, whence K, K ∈ A * (e); and similarly if J , e is redundant. Either way, then, A * |= I ψ.
The recursive cases are of the forms ψ = [e]π, e π, {α} τ π, where α is of the forms e, e f or e l . For the case ψ = [e]π, we need only observe that A * ⊆ A. For the case ψ = e π, suppose A |= I ψ. Then there exists J ⊂ I such that J ∈ A(e) and A |= J π. By the finiteness of A, choose such a J which is minimal under the order ⊂, so that J ∈ A * (e). By inductive hypothesis, A * |= J π; hence A * |= I ψ. For the case ψ = {e}π, suppose A |= I ψ. Then there exists a unique J ⊂ I such that J ∈ A(e); and for this J, A |= J π. In particular, there is no K ⊂ J such that K ∈ A(e), whence J ∈ A * (e). By inductive hypothesis and the fact that A * ⊆ A, we then easily have A * |= I ψ. The remaining cases are dealt with exactly as for ψ = {e}π, noting, in particular, that A |= I,J e f implies A * |= I,J e f and A |= I,J e l implies A * |= I,J e l .
Theorem 1. Let φ be a formula of T PL + . If φ is satisfiable, then φ is satisfied in an interpretation of size bounded by 2 p(|φ|) , for some fixed polynomial p.
Proof. Suppose that A |= I0 φ. We may assume that φ has the form guaranteed by Lemma 2; and by Lemma 3, we may assume that the depth of A is at most of order |φ| 2 . As before, let Φ be the set of subformulas of φ. Say that a formula χ ∈ Φ is basic if the major connective of χ is neither ∧ nor ∨. For any interval I and any ψ ∈ Φ, denote by S(ψ, I) the set of all maximal basic subformulas χ of ψ such that A |= I χ. It is easy to see that, for any ψ ∈ Φ and I ∈ I with A |= I ψ, S(ψ, I) entails ψ.
We now construct a submodel A * of A, starting with the interval I 0 and choosing witnesses, tableau-style, for formulas in Φ. More specifically, the procedure tableau(φ, I 0 ) in Fig. 5 builds a labelled tree with nodes V , edges E, and the two labellings λ : V → I and L : V → P(Φ); the interpretation A * will then be extracted from A using this labelled tree. For v ∈ V , think of λ(v) as the interval represented by v, and think of L(v) as some collection of formulas which must all be true at this interval. The variable Q is simply a queue of nodes in V awaiting processing. Steps 1-5 ensure, roughly, that 'existential' formulas in Φ have witnesses as required; the embedded calls to univ(u) ensure that 'universal' formulas in Φ are not falsified by these witnesses. Note that the invariant A |= λ(v) L(v) is maintained, but that the function λ is not required to be 1-1. Note also that the individual steps in tableau(φ, I 0 ) are not required to be effective: all we require for the proof of the Theorem is the existence of the structure A * with the advertised properties.
We claim that tableau(φ, I 0 ) terminates after finitely many iterations, and that, upon termination, the tree (V, E) satisfies the size bound of the Theorem. For consider any path
From the above construction, for all i < m, the total size of L(v i+1 ) must be less than the total size of L(v i ), unless the call univ(v i+1 ) adds material. But univ adds at most |φ| 2 symbols to L(v i+1 ), and does so only if, for at least one event-atom e , e ∈ A(λ(v i+1 )). Since the depth of A is at most of order |φ| 2 , the length of the path v 0 → · · · → v m is then at most of order |φ| 4 . The bound on the eventual size of V follows from the fact that the out-degree of any node in V is bounded by 2|φ|. Now let A * = { J, e ∈ A|for some v ∈ V , J = λ(v)}. Evidently, |A * | satisfies the size bound of the Theorem; it thus suffices to show that A * |= I0 φ. In fact, we show by structural induction that, for any node v ∈ V and any formula ψ,
.) The base cases are of the forms ψ = , ⊥, ¬{e} . The case ψ = is trivial. For the case ψ = ⊥, the fact that A |= I L(v) ensures that ψ ∈ L(v). For the begin tableau(φ, I 0 )
Choose some object v 0 , and set 
. end for every end univ 
ensures that either (i) there is no J ⊂ I such that J ∈ A(e) or (ii) there exist J ⊂ I, J ⊂ I with J = J such that J, J ∈ A(e). In the former case, since A * ⊆ A, then A * |= I ψ. In the latter case, Step 5 of tableau(φ, I 0 ) ensures that, for some such J, J , we have w, w ∈ V with λ(w) = J and λ(w ) = J ; hence J, J ∈ A * (e) and A * |= I ψ. The inductive cases are almost as straightforward:
Step 1 of tableau(φ, I 0 ), there exists w ∈ V and J ⊂ I such that λ(w) = J, S(π, J) ⊆ L(w), e, J ∈ A, and A |= J π. By inductive hypothesis, A * |= J S(π, J), and since A |= J π, S(π, J) entails π, whence A * |= J π. By construction, e, J ∈ A * . Hence,
Consider any J ⊂ I with J ∈ A * (e). Certainly, then, J ∈ A(e); hence A |= J π, so that S(π, J) entails π. Moreover, by the construction of A * there exists w ∈ V with λ(w) = J, in which case the call to univ(w) ensures that S(π, J) ⊆ L(w).
3. The remaining cases are handled similarly to Case 1, or are trivial.
Corollary 1. The satisfiability problem for T PL + is in NEXPTIME.
Lower Complexity Bound
In this section, we show that the satisfiability problem for T PL (and hence T PL + ) is NEXPTIME-hard. Denote by N N the natural numbers less than N . Recall that an exponential tiling problem is a triple (C, H, V ), where C = {c 0 , . . . , c M −1 } is a set and H and V are binary relations over C. We call the elements of C colours, and we call H and V the horizontal constraints and the vertical constraints, respectively. An instance of (C, H, V ) is a list c 0 , . . . c n−1 of elements of C (repetitions allowed). Such an instance is positive if there exists a function τ :
n − 1) = c 0 . We refer to τ as a tiling. Intuitively, the elements of C represent colours of unit square tiles which must be arranged so as to fill a grid of 2 n × 2 n squares, with the top left-hand square required to have the colour c 0 . The constraints H (respectively, V ) list which colours are allowed to go to the right of (respectively, above) which others. The problem instance c 0 , . . . , c n−1 lists the colours of the first n tiles in the bottom row.
To show that a problem P is NEXPTIME-hard, it suffices to show that, for any exponential tiling problem (C, H, V ), any instance of (C, H, V ) may be encoded, in polynomial time, as an instance of P. We now proceed to do this where P is T PL-satisfiability. The main technical challenge is to encode, using a succinct formula of T PL, the information that there are exactly 2 2n pairwise disjoint intervals satisfying some event-atom t within a given interval I * . We begin by tackling this problem; the remainder of the reduction is more or less routine. The event-atom z will always function as a harmless 'dummy'; it occurs in subformulas z whose only purpose is to ensure that we remain inside the temporal logic T PL, rather than the more general T PL + . Define ψ 1 to be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ m:
Fixing a large number of tiles
[a 
Looking at the first row of (57), ψ 3 guarantees that, for all i (1 ≤ i < m), any subinterval I ⊂ I * satisfying b i includes a unique J satisfying a 1 i+1 and a unique J satisfying a 0 i+1 (with J preceding J ), as well as a unique L satisfying b i+1 . Further, ψ 1 guarantees that J includes a unique K satisfying a 1 i+2 , and J includes a unique K satisfying a 0 i+2 . Looking now at the second row of (57), the event-atoms q 0 i and q 1 i , which are satisfied uniquely within I, effectively 'nail' the L, J, J , K and K together so that L ∩ J ⊃ K and L ∩ J ⊃ K . A representative situation conforming to these constraints is depicted in Fig. 8 . , with the former preceding the latter; these must be, respectively, J and J , therefore. Again by ψ 1 , J includes exactly one interval satisfying a 1 i+2 and J exactly one interval satisfying a 0 i+2 ; these must be, respectively, K and K , therefore. Thus, we have the arrangement of Fig. 7 . In particular, we have seen that ψ 2 guarantees the existence of an interval L satisfying b i+1 and including both K and K , as required by the Lemma.
If I satisfies b i , then ψ 3 guarantees that I includes exactly one interval satisfying a 1 i+1 and exactly one interval satisfying a 0 i+1 , with the former preceding the latter; these must be, respectively, J and J , therefore. By ψ 1 , J includes exactly one interval satisfying a 1 i+2 and J exactly one interval satisfying a 0 i+2 ; these must be, respectively, K and K , therefore. Thus, we have the arrangement of Fig. 8 . In particular, we have seen that ψ 3 guarantees the existence of an interval L satisfying b i+1 and including both K and K , as required by the Lemma. 
, let J i be the first-occurring i-witness, and let L i be the unique subinterval of I * satisfying l i . Then the conjuncts in the first row of (58) enforce the arrangement
Further, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), let L i be the unique subinterval of I * satisfying l i . Then the conjuncts in the second row of (58) ensure that J i ends before L i begins, and, moreover, J i is the only subinterval of I * satisfying either a We are now ready to achieve the main ask of Section 6. 
).
Claim 5. Suppose A |= I * ψ 1 ∧ ψ 6 , and consider the 2 2n m-witnesses which satisfy a 0 m . Let these intervals be numbered in order of temporal precedence as J 0 , . . .
, and all i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2n) denote the ith digit in the 2n-digit binary numeral for k (counting the most significant as the first) by k[i]. Then we have:
Proof. By formula ψ 6 and inspection of Fig 6. Let us refer to the 2 2n intervals identified in Claim 4 as tiles, and let us write a 0 m more suggestively as t. Say that the kth tile in the usual temporal order (0 ≤ k < 2 2n ) has index k. If J is any tile, denote its index by k J . In that case, Claim 5 lets us read A |= J d h i as 'saying' that the ith digit in the 2n-digit binary representation of k J is h.
Organizing the tiles into a grid
Group the 2 2n tiles into 2 n blocks, each containing 2 n consecutive tiles. Regarding each block as a row gives us a 2 n × 2 n grid. If J and J are tiles, then J lies immediately above J in this grid in case k J = k J + 2 n ; similarly, J lies immediately to the right of J in the grid in case k J = k J + 1 and the last n bits of k J are not all 1s. Let v be an event-atom. We now write formulas ensuring that, for all tiles J, J such that k J = k J + 2 n , there exists an interval L satisfying v such that J is the first tile included in L and J is the last. . Let ψ 7 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 0 ≤ i < 2n, 1 ≤ j ≤ n and 0 ≤ h ≤ 1:
.
Suppose A |= I * ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ 7 . Now let k be any integer in the range 0 ≤ k ≤ 2 2n . By the first row of (61), there evidently exists a chain of subintervals of I *
is 0 for at least one value of j in the range 0 ≤ j ≤ n), the conjunct [f
in the second row of of (61) lets us extend the above chain to
where L satisfies v. And in that case, the final conjunct [f
in (61) ensures that the first tile included in L is J k . It follows that there must be at least 2 2n − 2 n − 1 distinct such intervals L. We now proceed to ensure that each such L includes exactly 2 n + 1 consecutive tiles. (See Fig. 9 .) As a preliminary, let let d * 1 , . . . d * 2n be new event-atoms, and ψ 8 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
The purpose of ψ 8 is to enable us to simulate the incrementation operation on binary numerals. Suppose A |= I * ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ 8 . Then it is routine to check that, for any tile J with k J in the range 0
if and only if i is the least integer such that the jth digit in the 2n-digit binary representation of k J is 1 for all j in the range i < j ≤ n. With this interpretation in mind, let ψ 9 be the conjunction of the following formulas, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n: Figure 9 : Arrangement of event-atoms indicating vertical neighbourhood in the grid If A |= I * ψ 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψ 9 , then we can read ψ 9 as stating that in every subinterval L ⊂ I * satisfying v, the indices of the first and last tiles included in L differ by precisely 2 n . Pictorially, we have the arrangement of v-satisfying intervals shown in Fig. 9 . The corresponding formulas ψ 10 , . . . , ψ 13 required to establish a suitable arrangement of event-types h encoding horizontal neighbourhood are analogous and need not be spelled out here.
Encoding Tiling Problems
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 2. The satisfiability problem for T PL is NEXPTIME-hard.
Proof. Let (C, H, V ) be any exponential tiling problem and c 0 , . . . c n−1 an instance of size n. Setting m = 2n + 1, construct the formulas ψ 1 , . . . , ψ 13 as above. If C = {c 0 , . . . , c M −1 }, take the c i (0 ≤ i < M ) to be event-atoms, and let ψ T be the conjunction of the following two formulas:
Given a tile J, we regard the satisfaction of an event-atom c j by a subinterval of J as indicating that the tile J is coloured by c j . The formula ψ T simply states that each tile has exactly one colour chosen from C. Let ψ H be the conjunction of the following formulas, where (c i , c j ) ∈ H:
Similarly, let ψ V be the conjunction of the following formulas, where (c i , c j ) ∈ V :
The motivation for ψ H and ψ V should be obvious. Finally, we encode the fact that the initial tile J 0 is required to have colour c 0 using the formula
and similarly for the other tiles which are required to have a particular colour. Denote the conjunction of all these formulas by ψ I . From the above constructions, it is routine to verify that the instance c 0 , . . . , c n−1 of (C, H, V ) is positive if and only if
is satisfiable. This completes the reduction.
Corollary 2. The satisfiability problems for T PL and T PL + are NEXPTIMEcomplete.
Linguistic considerations
We have now established that satisfiability in T PL is NEXPTIME-complete. Since T PL closely matches our English fragment T PE, we are close to answering the question with which we began: What is the computational complexity of reasoning with information expressed using the temporal constructions featured in sentences such as (1)- (3)? Only one small matter remains. As noted in Section 3.1, T PE-syntax is at best a rough approximation to actual English usage, and in particular, like all grammars, over-generates. Therefore, we must show that no linguistically motivated tightening of our fragment T PE could affect the above complexity result.
Obviously, restricting the set of sentences accepted by the grammar cannot enlarge the set of corresponding formulas, and therefore cannot increase the computational complexity of its satisfiability problem. To be sure, the complexity of the recognition problem (i.e. deciding whether a string of words is an acceptable sentence) may conceivably increase as we strive for closer approximations to English. In practice, however, this complexity is unlikely to stray outside the class NEXPTIME. Moreover, it is routine to show that the above complexity results for T PE-satisfiability apply even when the length of any individual sentence is bounded (so that only the number of sentences is unbounded); and under these conditions, of course, the recognition problem has linear complexity, since separate sentences are parsed independently. Discounting recognition complexity as a possible bottleneck, then, we may be confident that the NEXPTIME upper bound applies to any linguistically motivated restriction of T PL which we care to consider.
The possibility we must guard against, of course, is that removing ungrammatical (or otherwise unassertable) sentences from the fragment T PE might invalidate the NEXPTIME-hardness result just derived. And this is where the details of the proof of that result come to our rescue. For that proof depends on the encoding of tiling problems by the formulas ψ 1 -ψ 13 , ψ T , ψ H , ψ V and ψ I . All we need do then is to examine these formulas one by one and check that they can be generated, using the grammar presented above, by completely unobjectionable English sentences. If so, we know that any linguistically motivated restrictions on T PL will still include these sentences, and will assign them the advertised satisfaction-conditions. Thus, the NEXPTIME-hardness result will still apply to any improved grammar, as required.
The formulas ψ 1 -ψ 3 , given in (55)-(57), consist of conjuncts of the forms:
But these formulas express the meanings of the unobjectionable T PE-sentences:
(64) During the occurrence of a 0 , z occurred For added naturalness, we have fronted one preposition-phrase in each of these sentences; this facility could easily be incorporated into our grammar, of course.
Formula ψ l 4 , given in (58), additionally involves conjuncts of the forms:
these formulas express the meanings of the unobjectionable T PE-sentences: (68) During the occurrence of l i , l i+1 occurred while a For added naturalness, we have helped ourselves to the word either, which could be easily incorporated into our grammar.
Formula ψ 7 , given in (61), contains conjuncts of the forms:
; these correspond to sentences with three preposition-phrases, thus: (75) During every occurrence of f These sentences are certainly grammatical. Admittedly, huge disjunctions might be said not to belong to English as she is spoken; however, it is a simple matter to convert the relevant formulas equisatisfiably into formulas where disjunctions involve no more than three disjuncts, thus avoiding even this degree of unnaturalness. Formulas ψ 9 -ψ 13 , ψ T , ψ H , ψ V and ψ I present no new difficulties, and their translation back into idiomatic English is left as an exercise to the reader. We conclude that no linguistically motivated tightening of our fragment T PE could change the above complexity result. Reasoning with information expressed using the grammatical resources studied in this paper is NEXPTIME-complete.
Conclusion
In this paper, we defined the fragment of temporal English T PE, together with a matching interval temporal logic T PL. The satisfiability problem for T PL was shown to be complete for the complexity class NEXPTIME. In view of the intimate connection between T PE and T PL, we take this result to indicate the complexity of performing logical deductions in the fragment of temporal English in question, and thus to give a rough measure of the expressive resources which the grammatical constructions it features-primarily, temporal prepositionsput at speakers' disposal. By the standards of most interval temporal logics, T PL has low complexity. In the search for logics of limited expressive power, fragments owing their salience to the syntax of natural language are a natural place to look.
We have endeavoured throughout to be faithful to the facts of English usage while retaining a reasonably perspicuous formal system, amenable to mathematical analysis. These two aims are to some extent antagonistic, of course. Natural languages are products of human biology and human civilization, and as such do not always admit of a comfortable mathematical description. Thus, even the simple fragment of English considered here skirts many delicate issues in syntax, and includes sentences about whose exact semantics even native speakers are uncertain. In this situation, we have occasionally had to legislate, sometimes in whatever way is mathematically most convenient. Nevertheless, while faithfulness to the linguistic data is a virtue, it is all too easy, in pursuit of this virtue, to lose sight of the remarkable logical regularity of the constructions studied here; and it is this regularity that has been to the fore in our investigation. To what extent this analysis can be usefully extended to cover other temporal constructions in English (and other natural languages), and what effects such extensions will have on the complexity of satisfiability in the accompanying logic, remain open. OAdj → first/f OAdj → last/l P N,D → during/= P N,! → until/< P N,! → before/< P N,! → after/> OAdv → for the first time/f OAdv → for the last time/l P S,! → while/(=, { }) P S,! → when/(=, { }) P S,∀ → whenever/(=, [ ]) P S,! → until/(<, { }) P S,! → before/(<, { }) P S,! → after/(>, { }).
